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Abstract During the last two centuries, taxation has not only increased dramatically
in level and volume; its structure has also changed: from a heavy reliance on customs
revenue in the early nineteenth century to a stronger emphasis on income taxation in
the twentieth. A common explanation for this development is the spread of democ-
racy, which supposedly increases redistribution and the size of government. This
paper argues that the effect of democratization on taxation depends on the distribu-
tion of tax preferences in society. These preferences are not uniform: rural farmers
prefer different policies than urban workers. Thus, the impact of democratization
varies depending on the urbanization rate. The paper uses a novel dataset providing
data on government tax revenue in thirty-one countries in Western Europe, the Amer-
icas, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan—from as far back as 1800 up to the present
day—in order to evaluate the conditional impact of democratization on tax struc-
ture. The results show that democracy decreases property taxes in rural countries but
instead increases income taxes and decreases excise and consumption taxes in more
urbanized states. These results are robust to different estimation methods, a number
of control variables, such as interstate warfare, and to alternative measurements of
democracy.
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In 1850, the government share of the economy was not even 6 %; one hundred years
later, it had almost tripled. Not only did the last 200 years see an enormous increase
in tax revenue; the composition changed radically.1 Tariffs went from being the most
important source of tax revenue in 1880 to being almost insignificant a century later,
while income tax became a major part of government revenues during the same
period.
I argue that these radical shifts in tax structure can be explained by changes in
political institutions and economic structures. Specifically, democratization has a
substantial impact on taxation, but its effect depends on the preferences of the for-
merly disenfranchised, which differs between urban and rural sectors. By matching
class interest with specific taxes, I posit that the effect of democracy is condi-
tional on underlying political preferences. To my knowledge, no previous research
on the topic uses data stretching over 200 years and across 31 nations. The results
show that democracy decreases property taxes in rural countries and increases
income taxes and decreases excise and consumption taxes in highly urbanized
states.
In the period 1800 onward, we not only observe an increase in the size of
government, but also a change in the type of government. The number of democ-
racies among the 31 countries in the sample studied in this paper grew from three
in 1850 to 27 in 2000 (using the definition in Boix et al. (2012)). One influen-
tial theory points to the issue of inequality and argues that since democratization
increases the influence of the poor, more redistribution should follow. Although this
paper is less concerned with redistribution as such and focuses on tax revenues,
the fact that political reform allowed participation from previously disenfranchised
groups is important when explaining the evolution of tax systems. In my argu-
ment, democracy allows previously suppressed tax preferences to be heard, and
as a consequence to affect policy. These preferences are in part a function of
urbanization.
Another striking development during the last two centuries is the fundamental eco-
nomic changes brought about by industrialization. In many places, this led not only
to increased economic growth but also to changes in the geographical distribution of
the population. The proportion of the population living in cities of 20,000 or more
inhabitants rose from around 10 % in the middle of the nineteenth century to over
30 % in 1935 (Banks and Wilson 2012).
The timing of democratization in relation to how urbanized a country is matters
since tax preferences diverge between rural and urban voters. The previously disen-
franchised groups, for whom democracy grants influence over (among other things)
tax policy, are different in a mainly rural agrarian society than in an industrial urban-
ized country. Rural farmers, urban manufacturing employees, and the old elite had
different interests, not only in how public revenue was spent, but also in how it was
generated. While an urban worker prefers to shift taxation from consumption onto
1Based on thirty-one nations in Western Europe, South America, North America as well as Australia, New
Zealand, Japan and Mexico. See Section “Dependent Variables” for information on the dataset.
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property and income, a rural farmer is mainly concerned with lowering taxes on land.
In this way, the impact of democracy on tax structure depends on urbanization.
Although most of earlier research has focused on the adoption of income tax or
taxation as a share of the economy, there are exceptions. Timmons (2010a) considers
the determinants of tax structure in 100 countries between 1970 and 1999 and finds
that democratization tends to increase taxes on consumption but not on income. With
a more historical focus, Aidt and Jensen (2009a) find that franchise extension leads to
a higher share of direct taxation, but only when the collection costs are low. However,
they both fail to appreciate the impact of preferences over taxation and how these are
related to economic development. Urbanization is treated like a mere control variable
and neither of the two considers the possibility that urban and rural citizens have
different tax preferences and this in turn means that democracy can have a different
impact on different circumstances. I argue that we cannot understand the effect of
democracyon taxation without considering the preferencesof previously excluded groups.
The next section develops the theoretical argument. After that follows a summary
of two main types of explanation of historical developments in tax structure; the first
emphasizing the impact of political participation and the second interstate warfare.
The subsequent section presents the data and empirical strategy. Finally, results and
robustness analyses are presented followed by a short discussion and conclusion.
Preferences and Representation
My argument is based on the “classical” political science treatment of tax systems,
where demand for redistribution is seen the main determinant (Alt 1983; Kau and
Rubin 2002). In theory, enfranchisement of the poor would lead to more redistribu-
tion as long as the income of the median voter is lower than the mean (Romer 1975;
Meltzer and Richard 1981). Thus, democracy in itself should lead to a progressive
tax and transfer system, effecting reduced inequality (Lee 2005). While it is vital
to take both revenues and expenditure into account when considering redistribution,
it is important to note that the levels of social spending were very low before the
twentieth century ((Lindert 2004a): 20). Thus, for many countries, the revenue side
had real distributive effects, and in these situations, we can interpret the democracy
and redistribution theory in terms of progressive versus regressive taxes. This means
democracy is expected to have a positive impact on progressive taxes (e.g., income
taxation) and to be negatively related to regressive taxes (such as excise and con-
sumption taxes). Considering the revenue side independently is important in light of
the inconclusive evidence of a link between democracy and redistributive spending
(see Lindert (2004b) for evidence in support of such a link and Ansell and Samuels
(2010) for opposing evidence).
Another drawback of the redistributive framework is that it does not take the geo-
graphic distribution of voters into account. The newly enfranchised have different
preferences over taxation: the urban poor have different preferences than the rural
poor. Thus, the effect of suffrage extensions (and democratization more generally) is
contingent on who the poor are.
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The urban-rural cleavage was important both before and during industrialization
(although the importance and expression of these conflicts differed between coun-
tries) (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). As a country became more industrialized, class over-
took the urban-rural divide as the most salient conflict. This new group of low-income
manufacturing workers had different preferences regarding tax policy, for example, a
progressive income tax was more attractive than excise and consumption taxes. Moreover,
a concentration of this group in cities facilitated political mobilization (Rodden 2011).
Distributional conflict between peasants and urbanites was common in the nine-
teenth century and these conflicts were linked to political representation ((Baldwin
1990):63). For example, in 1891, Denmark introduced an inclusive pension system
financed by taxes on consumption. Farmers supported this scheme since the taxes
paying for it fell primarily on urban consumers (ibid.). Moreover, the literature on
the politics of agricultural protection has shown that not only is the urban/rural divide
important, it is also related to democratic reforms (Olper et al. 2014; Swinnen 2009;
Thomson 2016).
Rising urbanization shifts tax preferences for the population as a whole, but its
effect on politics is conditional upon effective representation. If a new group (e.g.,
urban workers) with different taxation preferences is excluded from politics, the
impact on policy is weak (unless there is a credible threat of revolution (Acemoglu
and Robinson 2001) or unrest (Thomson 2016)). Democratization in a predominately
rural society means a stronger influence of the rural poor while democratization in an
urban country means a stronger influence of the urban poor. Since these two groups
have different preferences over taxation, the impact of democratization is contin-
gent on the urbanization rate. On the one hand, if the poor are urban manufacturing
employees, we expect democratization to reduce taxes on consumption while increas-
ing progressive taxes such as income tax. On the other hand, if the poor are mainly
rural farmers suffering from heavy land taxation, we would expect democratization
to first and foremost lower taxes on land and shift taxation onto other groups (such as
urbanites). When considering the effect of increased political participation, we must
have an idea of who the formerly excluded are and have information about their pref-
erences. Urbanization provides a measure of the balance between urban and rural
citizens, allowing the formulation of conditional hypo theses regarding the impact of
democracy.
Before elaborating more on the preferences of urban and rural voters, two caveats
are needed. I am implicitly assuming that political institutions have an impact on
taxation and not the other way around. But this is not necessarily the case since
taxation can lead to popular mobilization in support of democracy and thus turn the
causal arrow in the opposite direction (see for example Bates and Lien (1985), Moore
(2004), Ross (2004), and Herb (2005)). It is also important to note that this paper
only concerns taxation and does not intend to answer questions about redistribution
since this also involves government expenditures.
Rural Poor
There is a growing literature on the politics of agricultural protection exploring how
the preferences of voters in this sector affects policy. While the agricultural sector
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is not always united in trade preferences—for example, grain farmers and live-stock
producers have different preferences over import restrictions (Swinnen 2009)—their
preferences regarding land taxation should be the same. That is, regardless in what
type of agriculture one engages in, lower taxes on land is always preferred. An exam-
ple of this is from the 1912 manifesto of the Swedish Farmer’s League party where
it argues for “Preventing any the slightest attempt to transfer taxes on the soil...” (my
translation) (Bondefo¨rbundets program (Farmer’s League’s Program) 1912).2 Reduc-
ing land taxes was also a major concern for peasants in nineteenth century France
((Weber 1976) as cited in Morgan and Prasad (2009)). More recent evidence suggests
that democratization in countries with a large agricultural sector leads to lower taxes
on this sector (Olper et al. 2014)3 and that democratization in highly urbanized states
leads to more agricultural protection (measured as the difference between domestic
and international price levels) (Thomson 2016). Moreover, the size of the agricultural
sector mattered for protection in late nineteenth century Europe (Swinnen 2009).
Earlier empirical work suggests that farmer’s preferences over consumption taxes
are not as straightforward. For example, many farmers in nineteenth century in Eng-
land were salaried workers on larger farms and spent 90 % of their income on grains
and potatoes (Swinnen 2009). Thus, both taxes on land and consumption hurt this
group. Since the economic structure of the agricultural sector varies over time and
between countries, it is not possible to determine a clear preference.
Because income taxes generally hit the more well-off harder than low-income
farmers, previously disenfranchised rural poor should support higher taxes on
income. Moreover, an income tax has a broader base than a land tax, so taxpayers
employed in the agricultural sector should prefer shifting taxes from land to income.
Even if the land is not owned by the poor farmer, shifting taxes unto the urban rich is
still better than raising land taxes since this will in part affect the wage of the farmer.
In sum, poor rural farmers are mainly concerned with reducing taxes on land.
Since income taxes hurt the well-off relatively harder, farmers should prefer shifting
taxes from land to income. However, their preferences over consumption taxes are
ambiguous.
Urban Poor
An individual spending most of his/her income on basic necessities such as food and
clothing will be more hurt by a tax on these goods than an income tax, even if both of
these are proportional. This is why taxes on consumption are generally regressive in
their impact (Joumard et al. 2012; Prasad and Deng 2009). The regressive impact of
consumption taxes is not a modern phenomenon, in late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century Sweden, for example, taxes on basic goods disproportionately hurt the
urban poor (Wicksell 1908). This was closely linked to politics as the farmers and the
2Even sharper formulations of this kind are found in the manifesto of 1919 (Bondefo¨rbundets program
(Farmer’s League’s Program) 1919).
3This based on 74 countries from 1955 to 2005. Importantly, the authors neither include data over
urbanization nor evaluate interaction effects.
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upper classes managed to shift taxes from property onto consumption, which meant
that the poor working class carried a heavier burden (Wicksell 1898), a burden that
would decrease with extended franchise (ibid.).4 Indirect taxes also fell heavily on
the poor in nineteenth century France and in the UK ((Bonney 1995):87, (Wicksell
1908)).
The urban poor was not only disproportionately hurt by consumption taxes, but
they also actively opposed them. An indicator of this opposition is the position taken
by left-wing parties. While specific positions on tax policy changed during the cen-
tury, a major difference between the left and the right remained the relative weight
put on income and consumption taxation. For example, both Labor in the UK and
the Social Democrats in Sweden fought for abolition of consumption taxes and heav-
ier income taxes in their early electoral manifestos (The 1918 Labour Party General
Election Manifesto (2000) and the 1911 Social Democratic party program (Misgeld
2001)).
Political representation of the urban working class also affects taxes on property.
Intuitively, the urban working class is better off if taxes are shifted from taxes on
consumption to taxes on incomes and/or property. This preference for higher taxes on
property (and especially land) is clearly present in the impact of late nineteenth and
early twentieth century organized labor. In the UK, the influence of the Labor party
in late nineteenth century led to increased taxes on land, and in Australia, the Labor
party introduced a progressive land tax already in 1910 (Barnes 2011).
In sum, low-income urban workers prefer to shift taxation from consumption and
unto property and income.
Summary
The rural poor wants to shift taxation from land unto income, but it is not clear if they
prefer increased or decreased consumption taxes. Taxes on consumption hurt urban
workers especially hard, and this group wants to shift taxation from consumption to
land and income; taxes that hurt other groups more, in particular high income earners
and farmers.
Table 1 below summarizes the tax preferences of the urban working class and the
rural farmers.
It is important to point out that there is not a straight channel between preferences
and outcomes in terms of tax shares. Administrative constraints can mute the effects
4The general point that democratic reforms tend to shift tax policy more in favor of the poor is also a
central component of the argument developed in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).
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of preference representation. Generally, a lower collection cost of a certain tax is
associated with a higher share of revenue from this source (Kenny and Winer 2006).
Urbanization and a larger manufacturing sector lead to economies of scale, making
self-employment comparatively less attractive, decreasing evasion and increasing tax
revenue (Kau and Rubin 2002; He 2013). Moreover, a concentration of people and
industry made collection and enforcement of some taxes (for example income tax)
less costly (Riezman and Slemrod 1987). Similarly, Tilly (1992:49) observes that the
growth of cities led to an increase in excise taxation. Since urbanization decreases
collection costs of income and consumption taxation (Aizenman and Jinjarak 2008),
this makes the impact of democracy stronger in more urbanized states.
In sum, as a result of administrative/collection costs, the impact of democracy
on consumption and income taxes is expected to be stronger in more urbanized countries.
War, Representation, and Tax Policy
Earlier research on the impact of representation is largely concerned with redis-
tribution, and the empirical results are mixed. While some find that democracies
redistribute more than non-democracies (Lee 2005; Mueller and Stratmann 2003),
others find no such effect (Ansell and Samuels 2010). Importantly, taxation does not
equal redistribution, and earlier studies employing historical data (and focusing on
franchise) find no effect of improved representation when considering income (Aidt
and Jensen 2009b) and wealth taxation (Scheve and Stasavage 2010).5 Interestingly,
evidence from more recent transitions (1970–1999) shows that democracy is asso-
ciated with increased regressive taxes on consumption but unrelated to progressive
taxes on income and capital (Timmons 2010b).6 Historical research into the origins of
income taxation finds that extended franchise decreases the probability of adopting
an income tax (Aidt and Jensen 2009b; Mares and Queralt 2015).
Instead of focusing on franchise extension in isolation, Aidt and Jensen (2009a)
posits that the impact of political reform depends on tax collection costs, which are
decreasing with literacy. Using data from 1860 to 1938 covering ten countries in
western Europe, they show that the impact of franchise extension is only positively
associated with the share of direct taxes when the enrollment rate (proxy for collec-
tion costs) is fairly high. But, by lumping together land and income taxes, they ignore
the conflict between rural and urban voters.
There is also a rich literature on the effect of different democratic institutions
on taxation and redistribution (e.g., Hettich and Winer (1999), Gould and Baker
(2002), and Iversen and Soskice (2006)). However, since this paper centers on the
democracy/non-democracy distinction, the effects of differences within democracies
fall beyond the scope.
5But, Aidt and Eterovic (2011) find that increasing political participation leads to larger governments in
general.
6However, Lindert (2004a) reports empirical support for the Meltzer and Richard (1981) hypothesis using
expenditure data.
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Another important literature is concerned with the impact of interstate warfare on
taxation. Whereby the observed increase in tax revenue is hypothesized to be caused
by mounting spending pressures, most significantly the impact of interstate warfare;
war is costly, and the ability to finance increasingly larger armies likewise resulted in
rising demand for state revenue. Existing revenue streams were not able to keep up
with the costs of war and this created a need for new types of taxes (Hintze (1970) and
Tilly (1992) see also Campbell (1993)). While the empirical evidence is not conclu-
sive, there is data supporting the argument that spending pressure was an important
determinant for the adoption of income tax (Aidt and Jensen 2009b) and that con-
scription during World War I led to more progressive income taxes (Scheve and
Stasavage 2010). It has also been shown that war pressure was, under certain institu-
tional circumstances, positively related to fiscal capacity in the early modern period
(Karaman and Pamuk 2013). Since all citizens are equally protected, war spending
has no strong distributional effects, and this makes the revenue aspect even more
important in terms of distributional conflict. The argument linking interstate warfare
to heavier tax burdens has been criticized for ignoring the temporal order of events
(Morgan and Prasad 2009) as well as being constrained to Europe (Centeno 1997).
While much attention has been directed towards the causal link between war and pro-
gressive taxation, it is also important to consider times of peace and a broader range
of taxes. That a country adopted a specific tax or that the rate is high or low does
not inform us about the importance of the tax in terms of state finances; the share of
total revenues does. Furthermore, by including eleven Latin American countries, this
paper has the potential to advance our knowledge beyond the historical experience of
Europe. What is clear, however, is that war (or threat of war) must be included as a
control variable.
Summary and Hypotheses
Democracy affects taxation through the representation of preferences. These are in
turn partly determined by residence: urban and rural voters hold different views on
how state revenue is to be generated.
Democratization in a rural country should lead to lower property taxes and heav-
ier taxation of income. However, if the urban tax base is small, it is not certain that
increased rates would yield enough revenue to offset a lower property tax. As men-
tioned above, administrative costs suggest that effects on income and consumption
and excise taxes will be weaker in rural countries.
Since the urban working class prefers taxes on income and property over taxes
on goods, democratization in an urban country is expected to lead to a higher share
of revenue from income and property taxes and a lower share from excise and
consumption taxes. This yields the following two hypotheses:
• H1: Democratization in a country with a high urbanization rate leads to: (a)
higher shares of income and property taxation and (b) lower shares of excise and
consumption taxes
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• H2: Democratization in a country with a low urbanization rate leads to: (a) a
lower share of property taxes and (b) a higher share of income taxes.
Empirical Strategy
Earlier research has been constrained either in time (by focusing on the post-Second
World War era) or space (by focusing mainly on Europe). Relying on post-war data
means leaving out important variation in the developed countries of the world and
many of the most dramatic changes in tax structure. Not only is prior knowledge
limited temporally, we also know much less about the relationship between taxation
and representation outside of Europe. The new dataset used in this paper is a first
step towards addressing these shortcomings.
In order to test the argument outlined above, I will provide descriptive as well as
multivariate evidence. The first section describes the dependent and independent vari-
ables. Then follows descriptive results and multivariate analyses. The final section
consists of robustness checks and conclusions.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables are shares of total central tax revenue. Focusing on shares
have several advantages over focusing rates.7 First, rates can be used not only to
generate revenue, but also to discourage a certain behavior. For example, the state
can tax tobacco for public health reasons, and the rates can be set so high as to
completely eliminate tobacco use, and consequently, no tax revenue is collected from
this source. A second issue with rates is that their effect depends on enforcement and
tax administration. A high nominal rate that is never enforced is not likely to generate
much resistance. Shares on the other hand are indicators of the resulting yield from
different taxes. An obvious problem with shares is that they are affected not only by
changes in rates, but also by other factors, such as total tax revenue. Some of these
issues are addressed in the “Multivariate Analysis” section.
Data on the dependent variables was collected in collaboration with Thomas
Brambor and covers 31 countries from 1800 (or independence) to 2012.8 As far as
we know, there exists no comprehensive historical dataset on public finance. Even
for OECD member states, no cross-national database provides information from the
nineteenth century up to today. Our dataset does so and is based on secondary sources
providing partial temporal or geographic coverage.9 Country-specific information
7Of course, including both shares and rates would be ideal, but time constraints only allowed us to collect
information on one of them.
8The countries included are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand,
Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands, the UK, the USA,
Uruguay, and Venezuela
9For example, Astorga et al. (2010), Flora et al. (1983), Mitchell (2007), and OECD (2012).
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Table 2 Expected effect of democracy
High urbanization Low urbanization
Income tax (H1a, H2b) + +
Excise and consumption tax (H1b) − +/−
Property tax (H2a) + −
was used to adjudicate between different sources and to judge the quality of the data.
The overall aim was to create internally consistent time series that connects to con-
temporary datasets, an approach suitable for fixed effects models (like the ones used
in this paper). A more thorough description of the coding process is provided in the
appendix and the codebook.
Total tax revenue is disaggregated into direct (property and income) and indi-
rect (customs, excises, and consumption) taxes. Property taxes include taxes on real
estate, wealth, and land. The income tax category includes taxes on income, profits,
and capital gains by individuals and corporations as well as taxes on payrolls and
workforces. Ideally, these categories should be measured separately, but the available
sources rarely allow for a more fine-grained categorization. Tax on consumption con-
sists mainly of sales and turnover taxes prior to the introduction of the value-added
tax in the 1960s. Excises are taxes on specific goods, for example, tobacco or alco-
holic beverages. The difference between consumption taxes and excises is that the
former are broad-based and the latter only cover specific goods. For the hypotheses
outlined above, the important aspect of both consumption and excise taxes is their
regressive impact, hence they are collapsed into one category in the empirical section.
Restricting our dataset to the central level allows for a much larger sample, both
in time and across countries, but it is problematic in cases where there is significant
subnational authority over taxing and spending as this revenue will not be included.
Another important aspect of the data is that the sample varies over time. Countries
are only included once they are independent, which means that the sample is smaller
in the beginning of the nineteenth century. This also means that European countries
are overrepresented in earlier years.
Even though the sample used in this paper is the widest available, it still excludes
a significant part of the world. For example, it contains no countries from Eastern
Europe or Africa, and only one country in Asia (Japan). Data availability also means
there is a bias towards developed countries. However, the universe of possible cases
also changes over time, for example, in the beginning of the twentieth century, there
were only 55 sovereign states (Karatnycky 2000).
In order to achieve maximum coverage in time and across space, we had to work
with broad categories of taxes, ignoring sometimes important differences within
categories (e.g., types of property taxes).
For more information about the dataset and coding, the reader is referred to the
Appendix and the codebook.
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Independent Variables
As explained in the theoretical section, not just representation, but effective repre-
sentation is key to my argument. Changes in political institutions must reflect the
inclusion of the previously disenfranchised poor and also the translation of prefer-
ences into policy. Boix et al. (2012) measure democracy based on both participation
and contestation, which fits well with the theoretical concept. Participation is concep-
tualized as suffrage rights for the majority of the male population and contestation
means that the executive is directly or indirectly elected in free and fair elections
(ibid.). Alternative indicators of democracy are evaluated in the sensitivity analysis.
Urbanization is measured as the proportion of the population living in cities with
20,000 or more inhabitants and is from Banks and Wilson (2012). This particular
level is chosen based on the study by Aidt and Jensen (2009b), which covers a sim-
ilar time span. Alternative operationalizations of urbanization are considered in the
sensitivity analysis.
A general process of modernization and economic transformation affects both
urbanization and the likelihood of democratization. Economic development is also
related to the technical aspect of tax collection costs. Thus, a crucial control variable
to include is GDP/capita (the data is from Maddison (2007)).10
As outlined in the “War, Representation, and Tax Policy” section, taxation is linked
to interstate warfare, and I have included an indicator for war. The data is from the
Correlates of War dataset (Singer et al. 1972), where war is coded as 1 for every year
a country is involved in an interstate war. However, the state does not necessarily have
to be directly involved in armed conflict to experience a threat; if close neighbors are
at war, there could be reason to upgrade and expand the national defense (which is
costly and might affect taxation). Moreover, strong defensive capabilities can deter
attack. In the sensitivity analysis, two alternative measures are evaluated: number of
military personnel and military expenditure (also from the Correlates of War dataset).
Finally, as a control for the general level of fiscal capacity, I include a measure of
total central tax revenues as a share of the economy.
Results
Table 2 below shows the expected results of the hypotheses. This reflects both the
expectations based on the preferences of urban and rural voters, as well as the impact
of administrative capacity that is expected to mute the effect of preferences in some
cases (represented by a “+/−” in the case of the impact of democracy on excise and
consumption taxes in a low urbanization context).
10The inclusion of GDP/capita as a control is also important if economic development is linked to the
prevalence of vote buying ((Stokes et al. 2013), ch. 8) and/or ballot reform (Aidt and Jensen 2016; Kam
2016). I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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Table 3 Four different scenarios
High urbanization Low urbanization
Democratic UK (1885–) Finland (1917–1939)
Argentina (1912–1930) Canada (1867–1900)
France (1887–1939) Switzerland (1848–1896)
Denmark (1901–) France (1870–1886)
Undemocratic Belgium (1830–1894) Sweden (1815–1911)
Spain (1893–1930, 1937–1976) Brazil (1862–1929)
Chile (1892–1908, 1925–1933, 1973–1989) Austria (1862–1918)
Netherlands (1830–1896) Portugal (1862–1910, 1926–1975)
Descriptive Results
To provide an overview of the sample in relation to the variables of interest, Table 3
shows four different combinations of urbanization (high or low) and democracy (yes
or no) with episodes from countries in the dataset.
The threshold between low and high urbanization is set the point where the pro-
portion of the population that lives in cities of 20,000 or more is twenty percent.

























Fig. 1 Urbanization and income taxation in democracies and non-democracies
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Fig. 2 United Kingdom
is indicated by the dichotomous measure from Boix et al. (2012). Note that this is
only a sample of country periods from the dataset since many countries occupy dif-
ferent cells during different time periods. What we can see immediately is that the
combination of low urbanization and non-democracy becomes increasingly rare with
time.
The relationship can also be explored graphically. Figure 1 shows the relationship
between urbanization and the share of income taxes for democracies and non-
democracies.11 In addition to the country year scatter plot, the graph includes a
lowess curve. The figure reveals that revenue from income tax increases with urban-
ization in democratic countries while the relationship is not present in undemocratic
states. This pattern is consistent with the notion that democracy in combination with
high urbanization leads to a greater reliance on income tax. Importantly, if urbaniza-
tion had an independent impact on income tax (through, for example, lower collection
costs), the pattern should be the same for both democracies and non-democracies.12
Figures 9 and 10 (in the Appendix) show that the share of property taxes
decreases while that of excise and consumption taxes increases with urbanization
in non-democracies. If urbanization lowered collection costs for property taxes, we
would observe the opposite relationship. In democracies, the share from excise and
consumption taxes increase with urbanization up to a point to then decrease.
11To save space, figures for excise and consumption and property tax shares are relegated to the appendix.
12I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this independent impact of urbanization.
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Since urbanization is almost universally increasing in time, these descriptive
graphs do not tell the whole story. The figures also hide important within-country
variation.
A third way of illustrating the development over time is examining individual
countries. For example, the UK is considered a “high urbanization” country through-
out the period but only a democracy for roughly half of the time span. Figure 2
graphs the development of income, property, and excise and consumption taxation
in the UK from 1800 to 2012. The shaded area indicates democracy and ticks mark
the beginning and end of the two world wars. In the period before democratization,
Britain relied more on excise and consumption taxation than income tax, while the
latter dominates in democratic years. Note also the clear ratchet effect of the First
World War; the subsequent decline in income tax share was not enough to offset the
increase (on the ratchet effect of war in the UK, see Peacock and Wiseman (1961)).
A country that experienced both rural and urban democracy is France. Figure 3
shows the development of excise, property, and income taxes in France from the early
nineteenth century to 2012. The light shade of gray indicates years with democracy
and low urbanization while the darker shade of gray represents democracy and high
urbanization. The first session of democracy is followed by a decrease in the share of
revenue coming from property taxes and an increase in excise tax revenue, consistent
with rural tax preferences. Interesting to note is that urban democracy is not associ-
ated with a marked increase in income tax revenue until the onset of World War I,
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While informative, these descriptive explorations can only take the analysis so far. In
the next section, I explicitly control for war and other possibly confounding variables.
Multivariate Analysis
It takes time before the effects of democracy on taxation are realized. First, the effect
of constitutional changes such as an extension of suffrage is not instantaneous. Sec-
ond, there is a process of learning involved in which voters and parties interact. For
example, it takes time for newly enfranchised citizens to organize into effective par-
ties. Third, there might be a lag between the move to democracy and the next election.
Finally, changing the tax mix takes time: there is a delay between the implemen-
tation of a tax law and a measurable impact on government revenue. For all these
reasons, I have chosen a dynamic error correction model (ECM) that in a simple and
straightforward way partitions short-run and long-run effects.13 An easy way to think
about an ECM is to consider the long-run relationship between X and Y as an equi-
librium. Shocks to the equilibrium relationship can have an immediate effect, but the
adjustment to a new long-run relationship is allowed to take time (De Boef and Keele
2008).14 For instance, democratization can have an immediate effect on taxation, but
the total impact of democracy will probably take considerable time. Throughout the
analysis I will focus on the long-run effects of democracy.
An additional advantage of the ECM is that possible serial correlation can be mit-
igated by the inclusion of one or more lags of the dependent variable (Beck and
Katz 1995). Importantly, including a lagged dependent variable that does not elim-
inate serial correlation will lead to bias, while serial correlation in the absence of a
lagged dependent variable will not (Wilson and Butler 2007). Lagrange Multiplier
tests were used to determine the number of lags needed to eliminate serial correlation
(as recommended by Beck and Katz (1996)).15
The main specification includes country-specific intercepts to control for unob-
served heterogeneity across units16, and I include fixed effects for years to control
for common shocks.
The dependent variables are all measured as shares of total tax revenues. Although
these shares do not add up to one (customs revenue is not included, for example),
they are still likely to be dependent. That is, the share of income taxation might affect
and be affected by the share of excise and consumption taxes as well as property
taxes. Dependence across models means that estimating three equations separately
13While ECMs are most commonly used in contexts of cointegrated time series, they can be used to great
advantage even when the variables are stationary (as is the case here). For an excellent treatment of this
question, see De Boef and Keele (2008).
14It is important to point out that these effects can also be estimated using an autoregressive distributed
lag (ADL) model. In fact, the ADL and ECM are equivalent and produce the same results (De Boef and
Keele 2008).
15Two lags of the dependent variable eliminated serial correlation in income and property taxes, three lags
for excise and consumption taxation.
16Nickell (1981) bias is a potential problem when including fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable
in the same model. Fortunately, this bias is decreasing in T and OLS performs well with a T larger than 20
(see Wilson and Butler (2007) and Beck and Katz (2009)).
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is inappropriate. Therefore, the results are obtained using the seemingly unrelated
regression approach (SUR), which assumes that the error terms are correlated across
equations (Zellner 1962).17,18
The hypotheses concern the impact of democracy on shares of tax revenue con-
ditional on urbanization. In order to evaluate these conditional hypotheses, I include
interaction terms in the regressions and provide graphs illustrating marginal effects.
Formally, each equation in the system is estimated as




+β7(Democracyit × Urbanizationit )
+β8Xit−1 + β9Xit + δi + ζt + it (1)
The dependent variable, DV, is differentiated and included in lagged levels at
the right-hand side. p refers to the number of lags. The interaction effect and its
constituent terms are added in lagged levels and changes. X is a vector of control
variables, δ and ζ are fixed effects for countries and years, respectively.
In total, four equations are estimated in a SUR system. Table 4 reports regression
results for the share of income, property, and excise and consumption taxes. The
residual category (mainly taxes on trade) is suppressed for presentational purposes.
This table shows only the long-run effects calculated using the Bewley (1979) trans-
formation (De Boef and Keele 2008).19 These long-run multipliers are the bases for
the marginal effects graphs used to evaluate the hypotheses. I will comment on each
dependent variable separately and discuss the control variables in the summary.
Income Taxation
According to H1a, the effect of democracy should be positive and stronger for higher
levels of urbanization. This conditional impact is assessed in column 1 in Table 4.
The coefficient of the interaction effect of democracy and urbanization is positive and
statistically significant at the 1 % level. An effective way of exploring the hypothesis is
to graph the impact of X (democracy) on Y (share of income tax) for different values of
Z (urbanization) (Brambor et al. 2006). Figure 4 shows the conditional long-run effect
of democracy for a range of urbanization rates. The rug plot at the bottom of the graph
illustrates the empirical range of the urbanization variable and reveals that the number
of observations decreases substantially for urbanization rates over 0.8. Figure 4 shows
17Added in the estimates (but not in the results table) is a category representing customs and other tax
revenues not included in the list of dependent variables, in order for the shares to add up to one hundred.
18This is also the approach taken by scholars analyzing similar data, e.g., Timmons (2010b).
19Table 7 in the appendix shows the original ECM regressions. The Bewley transformation is a method
of calculating the standard errors for the long-run multipliers recommended in De Boef and Keele (2008).
Important to note is that this is a statistical transformation, not a model. This means that the R2 should not
be interpreted (ibid.).
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Table 4 Long-run effects
(1) (2) (3)
Income Excise and consumption Property
Democracy × urbanization 9.6*** −5.3 12.3***
(3.3) (3.2) (1.8)
Democracy −2.7* −3.4** −4.7***
(1.4) (1.4) (0.8)
Urbanization 22.5*** −11.5*** 3.3
(4.0) (4.0) (2.3)
War 3.8*** −1.0 −2.2***
(0.7) (0.6) (0.4)
Tax/GDP 0.8*** −0.2*** −0.4***
(0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
GDP/capita 4.4*** 12.1*** 11.2***
(1.4) (1.4) (0.8)
N 1141 1141 1141
R2 0.9 0.8 0.9
χ2 14212.4 5887.9 12141.9
RMSE 5.8 5.7 3.3
Standard errors in parentheses
Constants estimated but not reported
Year and country fixed effects included in all models
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
that the impact of democratization is positive and significant for higher levels of
urbanization while the impact is negative—but not distinguishable from zero at the
five percent level—for lower levels. This means that the long-run effect of democracy
depends on the urbanization rate in a way that is consistent with H1a.
If we consider a country with an urbanization rate of 55 %, a move to democracy
is associated with a long-term increase in the income tax share of approximately 2.6
percentage points. In contrast, a move to democracy at an urbanization rate of 10 %
is associated with an almost two percentage point long-term decrease in the share of
income tax revenue (however, this latter effect is not statistically significant).
H2b expects democracy to increase income taxes also in low-urbanization con-
texts since rural farmers prefer income taxes to taxes on land. However, the effect was
expected to be weaker because of administrative costs: if the majority of the popula-
tion lives in the countryside, administrative costs associated with collecting income
tax are high, lowering possible yield from this source. As we can see from Fig. 4, the
impact of democracy at low levels of urbanization is not statistically distinguishable
from zero, hence H2b is not supported by the data.
Taking urbanization into account shows that the positive relationship between
democracy and income taxes is only present in more urbanized states. This result can
explain why (Timmons 2010b) does not find an impact of democracy on income tax.
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Taxation of Consumption
Hypothesis 1b states that democracy in combination with higher levels of urbaniza-
tion should have a negative effect on excise and consumption taxes. Column 2 in
Table 4 shows that the coefficient of the interaction term is negative but just short of
reaching statistical significance (p = 0.102). A more effective way of evaluating the
hypothesis is to examine Fig. 5 which plots the marginal effect of democracy for dif-
ferent levels of urbanization. The figure shows that the effect is always negative and
suggests that this impact is stronger for higher levels of urbanization.
If we consider a country at the third quartile level of urbanization (36 %), democ-
racy is associated with a long-term decrease in excise and consumption taxes of 5.3
percentage points. However, this effect is not statistically significantly lower than
the effect of democracy on the first quartile level of urbanization, −3.9. In sum, the
results lend support to H1b, although with rather imprecise estimates.
This result is interesting considering earlier work showing a positive impact of
democracy on consumption taxes (Timmons 2010b).
Property Taxation
H2a states that if effective representation is extended in a rural country, revenues from
property taxes will decrease. In column 3 of Table 4, the data provides clear support
for this hypothesis. The coefficient for democracy when urbanization is zero is both
negative and statistically significant. The interaction term is positive and significant.
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Figure 6 shows that the long-run impact of democracy on property taxation is neg-
ative and statistically significant for low levels of urbanization while the effect is
positive—and statistically significant—for high levels.
For a country at the first quartile of urbanization (10 %), democracy is expected
to decrease property taxes with 3.4 percentage points while for a country at the
third quartile (36 %), the effect is significantly weaker and indistinguishable from
zero. For very high levels of urbanization, for example, 55 %, the impact is posi-
tive (two percentage points) and statistically significant. In line with the hypothesis,
the data suggests that the lower the urbanization, the stronger the negative effect of
democratization.
H1a predicts that democracy is associated with higher property taxes in highly
urbanized states since urban workers want to shift taxation from consumption unto
income and property. The results reported in column 3 of Table 4 as well as the
patterns in Fig. 6 clearly supports this.
Summary of Results
The data provide strong evidence in support of H1a and H2a: democracy leads to
greater shares of income and property tax in highly urbanized states while it reduces
the share of property tax in rural countries.
With regard to H1b, the results do not reject the hypothesis—the impact of democ-
racy for high levels of urbanization is negative—but the impact is also negative for
low levels of urbanization, weakening the results. The expectation was that lower
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administrative costs associated with taxing consumption in highly urbanized states
would make the impact of democracy more pronounced, but this is not realized in the
data.
Finally, with regards to H2b, the data reveals no statistically distinguishable impact
of democracy on income tax share when the urbanization rate is low. This could be
a result of rural countries having fewer salaried workers and the income tax yield-
ing more revenue in urban countries. Importantly, this is not the result of economic
development since the models include a control for GDP/capita.
Fiscal capacity (tax revenue/GDP) is associated with a higher share of income
tax and lower shares of property, excise, and consumption tax. The general level of
economic development (GDP/capita) is positively related to all three tax categories.
Unsurprisingly, war is positively related to the share of income tax. Importantly,
democracy still has an effect, contrary to the arguments in Scheve and Stasavage
(2010). Interestingly, war is negatively related to the share of property taxes.
Table 5 below shows the sign of the (statistically significant) effect of democracy
conditional on urbanization for the different dependent variables, as well as a column
indicating whether the results supported the hypothesis or not. As mentioned above,
H1a and H2a are clearly supported by the data, and while the evidence does not reject
H1b, the support is somewhat weaker since the effect seems to be negative regardless
of the level of urbanization. The results for income and property taxation are roughly
consistent with those reported in Aidt and Jensen (2009a), although that study groups
the two taxes together and focuses on administrative costs. The next section examines
the robustness of these results to different measurements and specifications.
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Table 5 Effect of democracy
High urbanization Low urbanization Support
Income tax (H1a, H2b) + None Yes, no
Excise and consumption tax (H1b) − − Yes
Property taxes (H1a, H2a) + − Yes
Sensitivity Analysis
The independent variable is democracy, and in the previous section it was measured
by a dichotomous indicator from Boix et al. (2012). There are a large number of con-
ceptualizations and measurements of democracy (see (Hadenius and Teorell 2005)),
but few cover the time span of over two hundred years. An exception is the widely
used Polity index (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). A re-analysis was made using a
dummy variable where a Polity score of seven or more is coded as democracy (the
cut-point is recommended by Jaggers and Gurr (1995)), and the results remain the
same.20
One of the elements in the Boix et al. (2012) concept of democracy is male fran-
chise. If there are gender specific preferences for taxing and spending, the effect
of female franchise might be different (e.g., Campbell (1993):169). To evaluate the
sensitivity of only considering male franchise I constructed a dichotomous variable
indicating full (male and female) franchise or not, using version two of the PIPE
dataset (Przeworski et al. 2013). The results remain essentially the same, although
somewhat weaker for H2a.
Since the expectation or threat of war can have similar effects as actual armed
conflict, the binary indicator used above might underestimate the effect. If a coun-
try experiences a threat of war, a likely response is to upgrade and expand the armed
forces. The number of people employed in the armed forces and the level of mili-
tary expenditures might thus be correlated with a heightened expectation of armed
conflict. As noted above, military personnel and spending can also function as deter-
rence. If countries that have a large standing army and high defense spending are also
less likely to get involved in a war, this means that the binary war variable can suf-
fer from selection bias. Data on these two variables is taken from version four of the
Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset (Singer et al. 1972). Using
any of these two alternative measurements does not alter the conclusions.
I used two alternative ways to measure urbanization: the first variable (following
Karaman and Pamuk (2013)) defines urbanization as the proportion of the population
living in cities of 10,000 or more, and the second uses 50,000 or more as a cutoff
point. Using the second measure of urbanization does not change the results, but
when using 10,000 as cutoff point, H2a is rejected.
20The complete results from the robustness tests are available from the author upon request.
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Another concern is the inclusion of fiscal capacity (tax revenue as a share of GDP)
in the models above. Since this might induce post-treatment bias, I have re-run the
regressions with this variable excluded. The results remain the same.
A related issue is that the analysis only compares early and late democratizers:
early democratizers had a larger rural population that later democratizers. This prob-
lem is potentially worsened by the fact that many of todays developing countries
are not in the sample. However, recent evidence from the post-Second World War
period including both developed and developing countries find that democratization
leads to lower taxes on agriculture, employing similar assumptions about the pref-
erences of the rural poor (Olper et al. 2014). As a robustness check, I have rerun
the models for two separate time periods. Section D of the appendix shows results
for 1800–1913 and 1913–2012 separately. For the period from 1800 to 1913, the
results remain the same, they even provide stronger support for the hypotheses than
when using the entire sample. However, focusing only on the 1913–2012 era, the
results do not hold. This may have several causes. First, by 1913, many countries
had already gone through major shifts in taxation—changes that in part was a result
of previous changes to the political system. If the relationship between democracy
and taxation is a path-dependent process taking a long time, measuring only part of
this period is likely to affect the results. Since the number of rural countries (both
democracies and non-democracies) decreases with time, crucial variation is lost when
focusing on 1913–2012 only. Similarly, the number of democracies also changes over
time.
Another issue is that the relationship between democracy and taxation might be
different in Europe compared with non-Europe. Applying the same model as in
section “Multivariate Analysis” on separate geographical samples generates the same
results, apart from the results for property taxes in the sample excluding European
states. The complete results are available in section D of the Appendix.
Although there are several reasons to choose the somewhat involved model pre-
sented in the main analysis, the results hold using much simpler techniques. Models
1–3 in Table 12 (in section E.1 of the Appendix), show results for a simple OLS
model with only the variables of interest included (in levels). The results are in line
with conclusions in the main analysis. Models 4–6 add panel-corrected standard
errors (as recommended by Beck and Katz (1995)) as well as country and time-fixed
effects. Again, the results remain essentially the same. Finally, models 7–9 add the
same control variables as in Table 4. Overall, the results are unchanged and even
stronger.
Another concern with the econometric specification is that it does not address the
fact that the dependent variables are bounded between 0 and 100. In section E.2 of
the Appendix, I present results using fractional regressions taking this property of
the dependent variables into account. These models are identical to the ones in Table
12 (section E.1), but employ logistic models and robust standard errors. Using this
approach does not change the results.
In sum, the results are fairly robust to alternative specifications and measure-
ments. One exception is H2a, which is not supported when using a different cutoff
for urbanization or when excluding European countries from the sample. This means
that the confidence regarding H1a and H1b is strengthened while the results for H2a
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should be interpreted more carefully. Moreover, the results change when restricting
the sample to the time period between 1913 and 2012.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that the impact of democracy on tax structure is con-
ditional on urbanization. Both descriptive and multivariate analysis suggest that
democratization in combination with high urbanization is associated with a greater
share of tax revenue from income and property taxes and a lower share from excise
and consumption. I also find that the effect of democracy on the share of property
taxes is negative when urbanization is low. These results depend neither on the indica-
tors used nor the particular econometric specification. Overall, the empirical evidence
indicates that the preferences of different classes should be taken into account when
considering the impact of democracy on taxation.
It is important to emphasize that the results presented in this paper are macro-level
patterns over two centuries. Thus, the interpretation of the results should be mainly
descriptive and further research is needed into the proposed causal mechanism. The
link between urbanization and public opinion needs to be grounded in better data,
even if this means focusing on a few comparative case studies.
A drawback with the theoretical framework employed in this paper is that it does
not generate predictions for taxes on trade. A theoretical expansion and refinement
should address this important aspect of taxation.
Finally, I have deliberatively contrasted democracies with non-democratic states.
But since different political institutions such as electoral systems have an impact on
geographical representation (Rodden 2010), further research should take differences
within democratic systems into account.
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Appendix
A the Government Revenue Dataset
This section provides a condensed version of the coding decisions involved in creat-
ing the Government Revenue Dataset. For a more detailed account of the dataset (and
all the sources used), the reader is referred to the codebook.
In many cases, different sources relied on the same underlying data but reported
conflicting estimates of revenue yields and the size of the economy. To complement
and adjudicate between existing databases, we combined information from these
existing datasets with information from country-specific sources. The overall aim of
the coding process has been to create time series that are internally consistent within
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a country over time and connects to contemporary datasets (such as the OECD for
European and North American countries and CEPAL for South America) in order to
allow easy updates of the dataset. An advantage of this approach is that it is suitable
for fixed effects models employed in this paper. We also aimed at minimizing the
number of sources for each data series while keeping high coverage over time. Our
main interest is to explain long-run trends within countries, so in situations where we
needed to prioritize between using one source to obtain cross-country consistency
and employing different sources to reach within-country consistency, we preferred
the latter. In the codebook, we list all the country-specific primary and secondary
sources that we used in the final version of the dataset.
The total tax revenue of the central state is disaggregated based on the guide-
lines set out in the Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 of the International
Monetary Fund (2001), but given the paucity of historical data and the focus of our
project, we combined some categories. Total central tax revenue is divided into direct
and indirect taxes. Further, two subcategories of direct taxes are measured sepa-
rately: taxes on property and taxes on income. The subcategories of indirect taxes are
consumption taxes, excises, and customs (which includes taxes on import, exports,
exchange profits, and profits from export/import monopolies).
The first important choice is our focus on central government revenue. Although
including all levels of government would be preferred, this was not possible given
our ambition regarding temporal and geographical coverage. The focus on the central
level means that the overall level of taxation is biased downward in federal countries
like the USA or Germany. We chose to express different categories of the budget as
shares of total central tax revenue in order to facilitate cross-country comparisons.
The second important choice was how to combine different sources. We have
collected information on public finance and economic development from a num-
ber of existing data sources. Several of these datasets relied partly on the same
underlying data. Nonetheless, many estimates of our variables of interest differed
substantially, especially further back in time. Since many of the sources overlapped,
one method is to average values. This approach is problematic for a number of rea-
sons. First, because many sources rely on the same underlying data, averaging would
hide the potentially duplicated sources. Secondly, coverage in time varies substan-
tially between countries. Averaging would mean that some sources are overweighted.
Finally, since the quality of secondary data differ considerably, averaging might
increase rather than decrease measurement error.
Instead of averaging across different sources, we followed a decision tree to decide
which sources to use as the basis for our estimates. The following rules were used
to guide the coding: (1) minimize the number of sources. If several sources cover
the same information, we prefer to use a single source across categories within the
same time period. (2) Prefer high-quality sources. We prioritize primary and country-
specific secondary sources. Since these sources often provide more detailed data,
this meant that we needed to do some of the categorization ourselves. However,
many of the cross-national datasets were of such a high quality that we confidently
relied on them for parts of the dataset. (3) Check the consistency of sources. When
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relying on two or more sources to construct a long-run series, we made certain that the
information is comparable when covering the same overlapping time period within
a country. In cases of a significant jump at the intersection of two series, this is
indicated by coding the last value of the ending series as missing. (4) Time series con-
sistency trumps cross-sectional consistency. As mentioned above, our main interest
is long-run trends within countries. When deciding whether to use the same source
to obtain cross-country consistency or using different sources to reach consistent
within-country estimates, we prefer the latter.
The tax categories are expressed as ratios, for example the share of the revenue
coming from income taxes. We strongly preferred the numerator and denominator
coming from the same source.
A.1 Coverage Per Country
Table 6 reports the temporal coverage per country and tax category. There are three
main reasons information does not extend all the way back to 1800. First, the country
might not exist or is not independent. Second, the country exists, but not the tax. And
third, the country and the tax exist, but there is no data. Since it is not always known
if data is missing because the tax was not in effect that year, if it was not collected,
if information is just missing, or if it was a war or some other major crisis, the dates
in the table below are from the year we first have data to the last year of data. When
the interval contains several larger gaps, I have marked it with an asterisk (∗). These
gaps have different causes. For example, a tax can be removed (e.g., income tax in
nineteenth century Britain) or data can just be missing because of war or occupation.
A.2 Trends Over Time
This section provides figures outlining average trends in taxation over time. Figure 7a
maps the development of the size of government as well as direct and indirect taxes
among the countries in the sample from 1800 to 2011. Figure 7b, c shows the patterns
for the subcategories of direct and indirect taxes, respectively. Finally, Fig. 8 provides
the average shares over time for the three categories under investigation in the paper.
B Figures 9 and 10: Property and Excise and Consumption Taxes
Figures 9 and 10 show descriptive scatter plots for property and excise and consump-
tion tax shares and their links to democracy and urbanization.
C ECMModels
Table 7 below shows the results from the complete ECM models on which the long-
run effects displayed in Table 4 are based.
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Fig. 7 Trends over time. a Size of government and direct and indirect tax shares. b Direct taxes. c Indirect
taxes
Fig. 8 Tax shares














































0 20 40 60 80 0 20 40 60 80
Non-democracy Democracy
Urbanization
Excise and Consumption Taxes
Fig. 10 Urbanization and excise and consumption taxation in democracies and non-democracies
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Table 7 ECM models
(1) (2) (3)
Income Excise and Property
consumption
Lag 1 DV −0.2*** −0.2*** −0.2***
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Lag 2 DV 0.2*** 0.2*** 0.2***
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Lag 3 DV 0.0
(0.0)
 democracy × urbanization 1.7 −3.0 −2.8*
(3.9) (3.6) (1.7)
 democracy −0.2 0.3 0.9
(1.9) (1.7) (0.8)
 urbanization 2.3 −9.4 14.9**
(17.2) (16.2) (7.4)
Lag democracy × urbanization 0.4 −0.4 0.0
(1.5) (1.4) (0.7)
Lag democracy −0.1 −0.4 −0.1
(0.7) (0.6) (0.3)
Lag urbanization −0.3 0.5 1.5*
(1.9) (1.7) (0.8)
 war 0.4 −0.3 −0.3**
(0.4) (0.3) (0.2)
Lag war 0.5 −0.100 −0.2
(0.3) (0.3) (0.1)
 tax/GDP 0.8*** −0.6*** −0.2***
(0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
Lag tax/GDP 0.0 −0.0 −0.0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
 GDP/capita 0.8 −2.8 0.2
(2.7) (2.5) (1.2)
Lag GDP/capita 0.8 −0.1 0.9***
(0.6) (0.6) (0.3)
N 1141 1141 1141
R2 0.3 0.2 0.3
χ2 588.9 507.8 458.5
RMSE 2.7 2.5 1.2
Standard errors in parentheses
Constants estimated but not reported
Year and country fixed effects included in all models
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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D Results for Subsamples
In this section, I evaluate four different subsamples: two geographical (with and
without Europe) and two temporal (1800–1913 and 1913–2012).
D.1 Results for Europe Only
Table 8 reports results from the same models as in Table 4, but restricting the sample
to European countries.
D.2 Results for Non-Europe Only
Table 9 reports the same results as Table 4, but excluding European countries from
the sample. It is important to point out that data on property taxation is missing
Table 8 Long-run effects (Europe only)
Income Excise and consumption Property
Democracy × urbanization 2.813 −2.578 17.25***
(3.435) (3.541) (1.785)
Democracy −1.447 −5.407*** −6.009***
(1.398) (1.442) (0.724)
Urbanization −6.888 −35.63*** 4.095*
(4.796) (4.910) (2.465)
War 2.584*** 2.074*** −2.776***
(0.698) (0.714) (0.358)
Tax/GDP 0.600*** −0.265*** −0.341***
(0.0706) (0.0720) (0.0361)
GDP/capita −5.384*** 20.12*** 14.81***
(1.515) (1.566) (0.787)
N 971 971 971
R2 0.879 0.751 0.926
χ2 8357.6 3871.5 13490.3
RMSE 5.642 5.751 2.998
Standard errors in parentheses
Constants estimated but not reported
Year and country fixed effects included in all models
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 9 Long-run effects (excluding Europe)
Income Excise and consumption Property
Democracy × urbanization 93.54*** −74.16*** −16.21***
(5.056) (5.837) (1.448)
Democracy −58.22*** 42.08*** 7.084***
(2.772) (3.186) (0.787)
Urbanization −45.82*** 123.3*** 1.307
(4.262) (5.165) (1.209)
War 5.068*** −5.316*** −0.935***
(0.725) (0.831) (0.206)
Tax/GDP −0.0205 1.134*** −0.0541*
(0.108) (0.125) (0.0304)
GDP/capita 28.92*** −15.48*** 0.406
(1.166) (1.339) (0.330)
N 170 170 170
R2 0.997 0.964 0.993
χ2 58673.7 5063.6 26208.7
RMSE 1.659 1.967 0.478
Standard errors in parentheses
Constants estimated but not reported
Year and country fixed effects included in all models
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
completely for a number of non-European countries, which reduces the observations
for all equations in the system.
D.3 Results for 1800–1913
Table 10 shows the long-term conditional effect of democracy on income, prop-
erty, and excise and consumption taxes. The models are identical to the ones
estimated in Table 4, but the sample is restricted to the time period from 1800 to
1913.
D.4 Results for 1913–2012
Table 11 presents results from models identical to the ones in the main specification
in Table 4, but with a sample restricted to the period 1913–2012.
St Comp Int Dev
Table 10 Long-run effects (1800–1913)
Income Excise and consumption Property
Democracy × urbanization 32.04*** −28.65*** 23.45***
(2.856) (3.022) (2.862)
Democracy −10.74*** 8.741*** −5.127***
(1.123) (1.186) (1.129)
Urbanization −6.981 27.65*** 8.257
(6.157) (6.475) (6.207)
War −0.0681 −1.274*** −2.913***
(0.425) (0.450) (0.429)
Tax/GDP 1.684*** −1.996*** −0.640***
(0.141) (0.151) (0.142)
GDP/capita 4.666* 20.08*** −17.29***
(2.489) (2.627) (2.506)
N 422 422 422
R2 0.889 0.948 0.956
χ2 3893.9 8111.5 9779.3
RMSE 2.450 2.575 2.466
Standard errors in parentheses
Constants estimated but not reported
Year and country fixed effects included in all models
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
E Alternative Econometric Specifications
In this section, I report results from two alternative specifications. First, single-
equation static time-series cross-section models employing panel-corrected standard
errors and time and country fixed effects. Second, fractional regressions taking into
consideration that the dependent variables are bounded.
E.1 Results from Single-Equation Models
Table 12 shows results from very basic single-equation estimations. Models 1–3
are based on the simplest possible OLS regressions, while models 4–6 adds panel-
corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995) and year and country fixed effects.
Finally, models 7–9 include a full set of controls.
St Comp Int Dev
Table 11 Long-run effects (1913–2012)
Income Excise and consumption Property
Democracy × urbanization −62.20*** 77.07*** −15.81***
(6.018) (5.595) (1.710)
Democracy 29.11*** −36.19*** 7.693***
(2.737) (2.542) (0.778)
Urbanization 71.23*** −29.22*** 16.45***
(5.440) (5.040) (1.550)
War 11.49*** −3.963*** 1.700***
(0.726) (0.661) (0.205)
Tax/GDP 0.469*** −0.261*** −0.291***
(0.0670) (0.0618) (0.0190)
GDP/capita 8.687*** −16.13*** 7.404***
(1.566) (1.480) (0.445)
N 719 719 719
R2 0.937 0.906 0.890
χ2 12418.1 8551.2 6678.0
RMSE 4.530 4.197 1.285
Standard errors in parentheses
Constants estimated but not reported
Year and country fixed effects included in all models
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
E.2 Results from Fractional Regressions
As a reviewer pointed out, my dependent variable cannot take values smaller than
0 or larger than 100. Fractional regression takes this into account and the models
in Table 13 use logistic fractional regression. Otherwise, the models are identical to
those in Table 12, apart from that the models in Table 13 employ robust standard
errors while the models in Table 12 reports panel-corrected standard errors.
The model is logistic, making the estimates in Table 13 difficult to interpret.
Figure 11 graphs the impact of democracy for different values of urbanization. The
graphs are based on models 4–6 (that is, the models with full controls). We can
immediately see that all graphs tell the same story as the ones in the main results
section. Note that the scale of the dependent variables in these models is 0–1 (in the
main results section, the scale is 0–100).
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Fig. 11 Fractional regression: plots of interaction effects. a Income. b Property. c Excise and consumption
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